Identity Theory

Progress in Relating the Two Strands

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INTRODUCTION

Early work on identity theory by Stryker (1968) and Burke (Burke and Tully 1977, 1991) held equivalent views of the fundamental ideas contained in George Herbert Mead's *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934). Both Stryker and Burke were inspired by Mead's emphasis on the importance of meaning in understanding and explaining human social behavior and interaction. Both recognized that Mead's work on self constituted a theoretical or conceptual framework rather than a testable theory (Stryker 2002 [1980]). Moreover, both conceptualized self as comprising multiple identities rather than a single more or less coherent identity. At the same time, as they moved their own theoretical and research ideas in different directions, finding in Mead's work theoretical justification for doing so, each recognized the legitimacy of the other's reading of Mead.

More specifically, Mead visualized human social behavior and inter-action as proceeding on two related fronts. One exists in situations and organizational life external to the subjective inner worlds of individual actors but deeply impacting these inner worlds; the other occurs within the subjective worlds of actors as the actors interpret and respond to the situations and organizational life they find themselves in.

The first strand of identity theory focuses on the first of Mead's fronts: the relationships between social structures and identities (Stryker, Serpe, and Hunt 2005). These structures may be large (economic, kin-ship, ethnicity, etc.), intermediate (schools, neighborhoods, etc.), or small (families, primary groups, social networks). These linkages have been at the center of Stryker's work ever since the introduction of identity theory.

The second front or strand of identity theory accepts as a background premise the validity of the first strand's assertions but focuses on Mead's second front: internal subjective processes within the minds of human beings. This second strand has been at the center of Burke's work over the past several decades (Burke and Stets 2009). Burke and his collaborators have been especially concerned with verification processes. This concern is grounded in Mead's view of social acts as reducing disturbances intro-duced by factors external to the individual. Given that identities are tied to structural positions, Burke et al.'s research argues that it is in the con-text of verification processes that identities constituting the self develop, stabilize, and change.

Neither Burke nor Stryker visualizes the internal and external processes as independent of one another. Rather, they represent the two fronts iden-tified by Mead. The most basic challenge we posed for the future called for a more careful examination of the interface between the two fronts (Stryker and Burke 2000). It was suggested that to help bring the two more strongly together, it was important that research be undertaken to show how the external identity processes entered the internal processes, and how the internal processes entered the external.

The 2000 article called attention to a variety of additional challenges facing identity theorists and researchers as well. It asserted that it is im-portant to have a fuller understanding of the implication that persons

in modern society are highly likely to hold multiple identities. How do multiple identities relate to one another? How and when do they support or conflict with one another? What are the interactional consequences of this set of interidentity processes? How are the self-verification processes involving a single identity influenced by the verification process of other identities? It also suggested that identities with different bases—role identities, social or group identities, and person identities—might have very different consequences. And, just what is the role of emotion in linking identity and social structure in impacting internal verification processes? How does the variable intensity and character of affective experience impact the commitment to and the salience of identities? Finally, though many more challenges are likely, can we develop measures of identity that do not involve self-reports?

CHALLENGES AND DEVELOPMENTS

The earlier article discussed the existing theory and research as of the year 2000 and what it had to say with respect to the challenges reviewed. The present chapter seeks to locate where we are with respect to these challenges 15 years after they were initially identified. What progress has been made, and where is additional work still needed? Further, we consider what new issues and challenges exist for identity theory, and what new work on these issues and challenges is being done.

Work Toward Merging the Two Strands of Identity Theory

Stets and Serpe's review of identity theory (2013) treats the two strands of identity theory as a unified theory. We believe it is, but the challenge is demonstrating in research just how the structural and perceptual aspects influence and indeed depend on one another. Some studies do just that.

   In the structural strand, Stryker's (2000) theoretical discussion of conflicting versus mutually supporting identities addresses this set of issues

abstractly, and subsequent research testifies to its empirical validity (see, for example, work of Serpe and Stryker: Merolla, Serpe, Stryker, and Schultz 2012; Serpe 1987; Serpe and Stryker 1987; Stryker et al. 2005). That is, using the terminology of identity theory, commitment (an external variable) influences salience (an internal variable), which in turn influences role performance and interaction. Because attachments are made or lost through interaction, there is a feedback loop ~~to~~ back to commitment.

Work by many theorists and researchers interested in identity has used a frame derived from their reading of Mead that emphasized what has been variously called the importance, prominence, or centrality of identities in explaining or understanding humans' interactive behavior. Examples include Rosenberg (1979), McCall and Simmons (1978), and Stryker (2000). The shared understanding of the concept behind these labels of identity importance, prominence, and centrality is that each contains an element of positive self-feeling reflective of self-esteem.

It is in this context that Stryker (informal communication)[1] proposed that examining the impact of self-esteem on the identity theoretic concepts of identity salience and identity commitment could be important in the attempt to "meld" the external and the internal faces of the Mead-inspired identity theory. It may help to understand how the external social structure impacts the internal perceptual processes emphasized by Burke (2004a) and vice versa. The evidence in Brenner, Serpe, and Stryker (2014) strongly suggests that subjects' ratings of the prominence or affective valuation attached to identities initially have greater impact on identity salience and commitment to identities than the latter have on that affective valuation. This research also suggests that, over time, there is reciprocity in this relationship that reflects the influence of still other variables, specifically self-efficacy in the case of this research.

In the perceptual strand, research also informs the relationship between perceptual and structural aspects of identities. Cast, Stets, and Burke (1999) suggested that the external positions of oneself and others in the social structure influence one's internal identity standards over time. They suggest that this happens when others have status equal to or higher than one's own status. In their study of newly married couples, they found

that the spousal identity standard of respondents changed over time to be more in alignment with their spouse's perception when the spouse had levels of education and occupational status higher than the respondent. Thus, the internal reflected appraisals process was contingent on where in the social structure the identity was embedded. The level of influence of one identity on another within the situation depended on the external positions in the structure in which the respective identities existed. Lower status identities conformed to the reflected appraisals of the higher status identities, but not the reverse. However, identities of equal status mutually influenced each other.

Another study examined how the resources that are associated with positions in the social structure have an influence on the ability of an identity to be verified (Burke 2008). This study, which also used newly married couples, focused on two status variables that indicated relative position in the social structure: White versus non-White and high versus low occupation status/education. Results showed that those persons in lower status categories (low occupation/education, non-White) were less able to verify their spousal identity, and the impact of nonverification on negative emotions was much stronger for those with lower status. Thus, it appears that one's position in the external social structure can facilitate or hinder the internal verification process through access to resources associated with the external position. Additionally, those in advantaged positions are protected against the negative impact of identity nonverification.

The different emotional reactions that persons have when identities are not verified (an internal process) seems to depend strongly on the relative (external) structural position of both the identity under consideration (the one being verified), and the identity that is the source of the disturbance creating the lack of verification (Stets and Burke 2005). For example, a person is likely to feel fear if the source of the disturbance is another who has higher power than the person does, or to feel anger if the source of the disturbance has lower power than the person. The type of corrective behavior in which a person engages in order to verify an identity seems to depend on the emotions that the person is feeling. A person feeling fear in the presence of a higher power other is likely to engage in

flight behavior, while a person feeling anger is likely to engage in fight behavior. Stets and Burke suggest that these different responses to the same disturbance act to preserve the existing social structure, in this case the existing power differences associated with levels of power or status. In this way, the effect of external position in the social structure influences the internal verification process, which in turn maintains not only the identities of the individuals involved but also the external structure in which those identities are embedded.

Stets and Cast (2007) provide yet another study examining the relationship between the external social structure in which identities are embedded and the internal identity processes involved in the verification process. In this work, the authors looked not only at how *role identities* are influenced by the level of resources provided by individuals' position in the social structure but also at how *person identities* are influenced by these resources. The message is similar: the internal process of verification of both role and person identities is facilitated by the level of structural resources (e.g., occupation and education) available to the individual because of their social position. Stets and Cast also found that identity verification brought more resources to the individual.

At the same time, studies are beginning to show how the verification process is important for defining and changing social structure. For example, an experimental study using a social exchange framework (Savage, Stets, Burke, and Sommer 2014) shows that by providing feedback that is inconsistent with a fairness identity standard, inequality in exchange earnings changes in the direction that counteracts the feedback. That is, persons with identities that are highly fair who are told they are not being fair act to counteract the feedback by being fairer and as a consequence receive less in the bargaining. Persons with low fair identities who are told they are being very fair become even less fair and earn more in the bargaining. The changes increase the level of inequality in these exchange networks. In this way, the fairness identity and its verification play a significant role in the development of structural inequality.

Another study shows how the fairness identity and its verification play an important role in the creation of strong bonds and trust within

exchange networks (Stets, Burke, and Savage 2015). Persons whose fairness identity is not verified trust their exchange partners less, have less affective regard for their exchange partners, and have lower bonds to the relationship. Failure of verification reduces the degree to which the network becomes a group. Thus, as Ervin and Stryker (2001) claim more generally, internal cognitive processes are also involved in the reconstruction of social structures as well as being impacted by those structures. The external and internal aspects of identity are mutually intertwined.

In sum, there has been much work in the last 15 years that combines the two strands of identity theory identified by Stryker and Burke (2000), making it clear that there is only one identity theory. Each of the two strands can be understood only by considering aspects of the other strand. Links among identities and between the social structure and identity verification processes are not independent of one another. The research makes clear that both must be taken into account as the theory moves forward in the future. The same can be said of other external and internal identity processes.

Work on Multiple Identities Held by an Actor

The fact that people hold multiple identities has long been recognized, going back to William James (1890). Only in recent years, however, have identity theorists begun to systematically examine the effects of having multiple identities (Burke 2003; Smith-Lovin 2003; Stryker 2000; Thoits 2003). Part of the reason that research on multiple identities is lacking involves an inherent methodological difficulty. Studying the internal relationships among multiple identities requires measuring the many meanings that define each of the many identities involved, making it difficult to measure and investigate the relationship among more than a few identities at a time.[2]

Some work during the last fifteen years has studied several identities held by an actor, but has done so by examining the processes of each identity without looking at how the several identities influence each other.

Stets and Harrod (2004), for example, show how the resources that people have help them verify three different identities that they hold: a work identity, an academic identity, and a friend identity. Additionally, they show that verification of each of these three identities increases the level of self-esteem and mastery of the persons.

Stets and Biga (2003), on the other hand, examined two identities that were not independent of each other but were related hierarchically. These identities were one's gender identity and one's environmental identity (a person identity). Their model viewed the gender identity, which is relevant across more situations, as higher in the control hierarchy than the environmental identity, therefore influencing the environmental identity. While showing that each identity had effects, it turned out in this instance that there was no effect of the gender identity on the environmental identity. Their method of analysis, however, opened up ways to investigate the relationship among multiple identities within a person. The multiple identities must all be activated at the same time (Stryker 2000).

We are only beginning to discover the external conditions under which more than one identity may be activated, or to discover the internal relationships among the multiple identities that one may have when they are initiated. Stryker's (2000) thoughts on identity and social movement participation focus on the contingencies serving to activate, modify, or inhibit the behavioral expression of one identity when another identity is simultaneously triggered. For example, a son/daughter may move from dangerously activating a revolutionary identity to a more passive form of involvement in his/her revolution when a parent invokes the duties of a good son/daughter in order to provide parental care. Initiating the child/parent identities at a time when the child's revolutionary identity is initiated brings the two identities into a confrontation with one another with the possibility that their different goals may be reconciled.

While the activation of many identities and the relationship among the activated identities are questions framed from the two strands of identity theory (Stryker and Burke 2000), we suspect that full answers to either question depend on answers to the other. The first issue focuses on the relationship between identities and the social structure that influence

one's commitment to and the salience of identities. Questions arise such as what structural conditions increase the commitment to and salience of identities?, What is it that makes more than one identity active at a given time?, and How is one's position in the social structure tied to the many identities one has and the commitment to and salience of those identities? A second set of questions concerns the internal workings of identities: How do multiple identities operate in the overall perceptual control system?, Do identities control one another?, Do they operate independently?, and Under what conditions do one or another of these options happen?

Early work on multiple identities included neither the structural elements of commitment nor the internal questions of the relationships among multiple identities. Thoits's (1983) work on the identity accumulation hypothesis is an example. This work showed that having more identities situated people more strongly in society and gave their lives more meaning. This resulted in greater psychological well-being. The idea of identity accumulation became more nuanced over time with the recognition that if stress was associated with an identity (an internal process), having more identities was not necessarily better (Thoits 2003). This was especially true for obligatory role identities—those difficult to exit because of the high cost involved, for example, work or marriage—rather than more voluntary role identities that have a lower cost for exiting. Additionally, this work showed that the accumulation of obligatory identities was not as beneficial as the accumulation of voluntary identities.

This idea of the positive consequences of accumulating multiple identities was further explored by Burke and Cerven (2015), who added an investigation of the internal process of verification of the identities. Their findings show that having more identities increases positive emotions, reduces negative emotions, and enhances self-esteem, but only if those identities are verified. The accumulation of identities that are not verified reverses these positive effects: having more unverified identities leads to heightened negative emotions and lowered self-esteem. This holds for both obligatory and voluntary identities. Thus, the stress that Thoits suggested prevented multiple identities from enhancing psychological well-being can be

located in the identity-verification process and indicates more clearly how the structural and perceptual strands of identity theory are intertwined in our understanding of the relationships among multiple identities.

What Burke and Cerven show is that while verification increases esteem and positive emotions (cf. Cast and Burke 2002; Stets and Burke 2014a), having more identities that are verified further increases esteem and positive emotions. Thus, both the number of attachments of identities to the social structure and the nature of those attachments and the internal verification process must be considered to understand psychological well-being.

Another consideration involving multiple identities is the nature of the relationship among those identities within a person. We do know that if any two identities have different standards for some shared dimension of meaning, and both are activated at the same time, the conflict between them will create distress (Burke and Stets 2009). A male minister whose gender identity is set at a high level of dominance and whose minister identity is set at a lower level of dominance cannot satisfy both identities at the same time. When this condition occurs, the standard for each identity will likely change over time in the direction of the other identity to remove the conflict. To nullify the distress of competing identities, people are likely to actively work to avoid simultaneous activation of those identities, allowing each to be activated in different times and/or places (Hormuth 1991). To the extent that such segmentation is possible, the pressure toward identity change will be minimized.

Multiple identities may also compete with each other for time, because not all identities can be activated at the same time. As Stryker (2000) has shown, salience and commitment both help to sort out which identities are played out in a given time or space. When one identity has higher commitment (being linked to many rather than a few others), that identity will become more salient, having a higher probability of being enacted than an identity with less commitment. Thus, the salience hierarchy helps sort out the competition for enactment.

In addition to variations in the salience hierarchy, we know that not all identities are at the same level in the control hierarchy. Identities that are at a higher level of control have outputs that influence standards for

identities at lower levels. An early example exists in Burke's research (1997) in which subjects in an exchange network had three control systems (identities), each with its own identity standard controlling negotiating behavior. The output of the lowest level was an exchange offer of a certain number of points, and the standard for this identity was itself controlled by other higher systems that had their own standards. These higher system identity standards concerned how often to be included in the exchanges, the length of time in which to negotiate, and avoiding earning nothing. In this way, different identities were coordinated and came to work together by being commonly controlled by a higher level identity.

Another example of coordination achieved through higher order identities controlling the standards for lower order identities is Tsushima and Burke's work (1999). Their research showed that parents whose parenting identity aimed toward the inculcation of general principles into their children (for example, having the identity of being independent) had a less stressful time than parents who worked to teach their children a myriad of particular programs such as picking up after themselves, getting up on time for school, and doing their chores. The children who learned to be independent (a higher order identity) could coordinate the many programs of activity they had without the parents always being after them, much to the relief of those parents.

Even when identities are on the same level, the relationship between them depends on the position in the social structure of the person holding the identities. For example, Burke (2003) has shown that the task-leadership identity (from low to high) and the socioemotional leadership identity (also from low to high) in a task-oriented group have a different relationship to each other depending on whether the actor is in the position of coordinator in the group. Although the two different leadership identities are in general independent of each other, persons in the coordinator position in the group are more likely to perform both roles together because of expectations of others in the group for persons in the coordinator position. Persons who are not coordinators do not have this pressure, and the performance of the two roles is fairly independent. Again,

it is position in the social structure that changes the relationship between these two identities.

As studies examining either the structural conditions that activate more than one identity at a time or the relationship among the activated multiple identities, the various links between the external structure and the internal processes will be better understood. Perhaps as new measurement procedures are developed, the amount of work done on these issues will increase.

Work on the Different Bases of Identities

A third challenge that Stryker and Burke (2000) identified was to better understand the different bases of identities. When work on identity theory began (Stryker 1968), the focus was primarily on role identities, roles being among the basic components of the social structure. This focus offered the best advantage to begin to better understand the links between society (structure) and the individual (identity). The concepts of salience (internal) and commitment (external) tied identities to the self, on the one hand, and social structure on the other. Variation in role performance could then be understood as stemming from variations in the way the self is tied to the social structure and the multiple roles that define it. Roles were thus the first base on which identities were understood to be anchored.

As work progressed, however, it became clear that certain aspects of the social structure around which identities formed were missing from the theory. Society is also composed of social categories and groups that could form anchors for what came to be understood as social identities as opposed to role identities (Stets and Burke 2000). By including social identities, one could theorize about gender identities, ethnic identities, and identities that tie one to particular groups or organizations as members.[3]

Over time, it became increasingly clear that there were identities held by individuals that were not tied to either roles or groups and social categories. There were identities that distinguished one person from another as a unique individual, as being, for example, more or less dominant or more or less moral. These person identity characteristics are like traits

(Stryker 2007) but have the element of verification: people try to maintain their level of fairness and avoid being thought to be more fair or less fair than they are (Savage et al. 2014). Alternatively, they try to maintain and verify their level of morality so that others see them as they see themselves (Stets and Carter 2011, 2012). Controlling the levels of these characteristics is the hallmark of an identity not usually shared by simple traits, which only describe the characteristics of the person.

Because identities from all three bases (role, social, and person) function the same way in terms of the verification process, studies of identities can examine an identity from any base. However, to understand the ways in which identities from different bases may differ in their functioning, it is important to study multiple identities of individuals across the different bases. Only recently has work begun on this front. Building on the idea that identity verification increases self-esteem, Burke and Stets (2009) suggested that verification of identities from different bases increased different components of self-esteem. They hypothesized that the verification of role identities tended to increase efficacy-based esteem, the verification of social identities increased worth-based esteem, and the verification of person identities increased authenticity-based esteem.

A recent study sought to refine and test this idea examining the specific meanings that are confirmed when different identities are verified (Stets and Burke 2014a). Stets and Burke suggested that the mechanism linking identity bases with esteem bases lies in the types of meanings generally attached to identities with different bases. Identity meanings having to do with agency and accomplishment are most associated with role identities. Identity meanings having to do with social belongingness and integration tend to be associated with social identities. Identity meanings that represent being authentic are associated with person identities. As a result of the verification process, there is a general alignment of role identities with feelings of efficacy, of social identities with feelings of worth, and of person identities with feelings of authenticity. Stets and Burke (2014a) recognized, however, that any particular identity may have meanings that cross these lines. For example, they found that verification of the moral identity (a person identity) increased feelings of authenticity as expected,

but also because of its meanings of social value, increased feelings of self-worth. Similarly, they found that the verification of one's gender identity (a social identity) increased feelings of worth as expected, but also because gender becomes a very personal characteristic, its verification increased feelings of authenticity. Finally, they found that verification of the student identity (a role identity) increased feelings of efficacy as expected.

The results of this study provide our first indication of some variation in the consequences of identity verification across the different bases of identities because of the different ways in which identities with different bases are tied to the social structure. Verification affects structure and performance on the one hand; it affects group or category boundaries and inclusiveness on the other; and it affects the characteristics of the individual across roles, groups, and settings.

Recently, it has been suggested that person identities move people toward or away from particular groups or roles (Burke and Stets 2015). Because the meanings and expectations in the identity standards of person identities come from meanings available in the cultures and subcultures of society reflecting the divisions of society, the meanings that are taken on in person identities make people gravitate toward roles or groups that embody these meanings and avoid groups or roles that have inconsistent meanings. Person identities thus help provide a sorting mechanism in society to move people into or away from the different roles and groups.

It is clear that some headway has been made in the last 15 years in understanding the different bases on which identities are formed. However, there are many more questions to investigate. Because persons are embedded in roles, and roles are embedded in groups and organizations, the clear analytic distinction between the different bases becomes muddy in practice. Sorting out the structural and internal consequences of this embedding must still be accomplished.

Work on Identities and Emotions

Achieving a better understanding of the role of emotion in identity theory was another challenge that was identified by Stryker and Burke (2000).

The verification process has long been understood in identity theory to be one of the prime generators of emotion. Early work suggested that if persons performed well in a role, they would feel good (Franks and Marolla 1976). If we assume that performing well in a role (from the point of view of the self or others) is the same as role identity verification (reflected appraisal meanings match identity standard meanings), then this was early evidence of verification producing positive emotion. Other early work (Burke 1991, 1996) only suggested that failure of the verification process produced heightened levels of distress. In one of the first papers to measure emotional outcomes as a result of verification, Burke and Stets (1999) found that the degree of mutual verification of the spousal identity influenced the degree to which husbands and wives loved and trusted each other and formed an emotion bond in the sense of a feeling of "we-ness."

Burke and Harrod (2005) directly examined the impact of the degree of identity verification on several emotions, including depression, anger, and general distress as well as feelings of self-worth and self-efficacy. They reasoned that whether the nonverification occurred because of an ~~overevaluation~~ by others or because of an underevaluation of others, given the consistency principle on which the identity model is based, negative feelings should occur. To model this, they included two effects of a discrepancy or difference between reflected appraisal meanings and identity meanings. Such a discrepancy represents the lack of verification. They included both a linear term (where overevaluation produces positive feelings and underevaluation produces negative feelings) and a squared term (where both over- and underevaluation produce negative feelings). Their results showed that the effect of the squared discrepancy overrode any linear effect and influenced all of the outcomes studied: the greater the nonverification (either under or over), the greater was the level of depression, anger, and distress expressed by the respondents.

Some early laboratory studies of the emotional consequences of identity nonverification showed a positive emotional response (an enhancement effect) when feedback from others was higher than the identity standard (Stets 2003, 2004, 2005; Stets and Asencio 2008; Stets and Osborn 2008). These studies used actual feedback compared with the identity standard

rather than the reflected appraisals, or how the individuals themselves
thought others saw them. Also missing from this early work was a mea-
sure of the relevance of situational meanings for the identity in question.
Stets and Burke (2014b) looked at the issues of using reflected appraisals
to assess identity nonverification and ~~assessing~~ the relevance of situational
meanings for the identity when they examined seven different studies that
used both survey procedures and experimental procedures to examine the
emotional consequences of nonverification of the moral identity.

The results for both the survey procedures and the laboratory proce-
dures confirmed Burke and Harrod's (2005) results that negative emotion
formed a U-shaped function, with greater departures from verification,
both in a positive and a negative direction, yielding increased negative
feelings. But, nonverification needed to be measured in terms of the dif-
ference in meanings between reflected appraisals and the identity stan-
dard. And, there were only minimal effects, if any, when the meanings in
the situation were not relevant for this identity in question. It thus became
clear that proper measurement of nonverification, as the difference be-
tween one's reflected appraisals and the identity standard, was necessary
to test or demonstrate the theory.

To date, most of the work examining the effect of identity verification
on emotion has dealt with general measures of positive or negative feel-
ings rather than specific emotions. Empirical research on specific emo-
tions is rare, though Ellestad and Stets (1998) studied jealousy in the
home and Stets and Tsushima (2001) look at anger in the home and at
work. Stets and Burke (2005) do theorize about various specific emotions
that might arise from identity nonverification depending on a number of
contextual factors that vary from situation to situation. Included among
these hypothesized factors are whether the source of the identity standard
is the actor or another, whether the nonverification is the result of actions
by the actor or another, and whether the other has higher, equal, or lower
status and/or power than the actor. This last factor, of course, indicates
the importance of one's position in the social structure for the internal
identity processes producing emotion.

They suggest, for example, that when the self is the source of the nonverification and the other has higher power one might feel sadness, while if the other has equal power one might feel disappointment, and if the other has less power than the self, one might feel displeasure. On the other hand, when the other is the source of the nonverification, one might feel fear if the other has higher power, anger if the other has equal power, and rage if the other has less power than the self. Stets and Burke suggest that these variations in specific emotions have evolved to both reduce the immediate discrepancy or nonverification and at the same time preserve the structural relationships that help define the identities and structures involved. The particular emotions and the actions they generate are the ones that best serve this purpose.

Stets and Carter (2011, 2012) examined the moral emotions of shame and guilt as responses to the nonverification of one's moral identity. They found that having a higher moral identity reduced the frequency of cheating in a laboratory experiment, and increased the likelihood of choosing a more moral option in a moral dilemma survey. This was especially true when the situation was framed by the individual as being high in moral content. When the situation was framed as high in moral content and the person chose the less moral option in the dilemma, the person experienced higher levels of guilt and shame than when he or she chose the more moral option.

Other work on identities and emotions in the last 15 years shows that emotions generated from the verification process at one point in time persist over time and come to influence the verification process a later point in time (Stets and Osborn 2008). Stets and Osborn showed that positive emotions that arise early in time can buffer the effects of nonverification at a later point. In recent work, Trettevik (2015) shows that not only does a discrepancy between meanings in the identity standard and reflected appraisals create negative emotions but also that the verification process also plays a role in generating emotions. If the person is making faster progress toward verification than expected, positive feelings are increased and negative feelings are reduced. On the other hand, if the rate of progress toward verification is slower than expected, negative feelings are intensified.

Finally, Burke (2004b) extended work on the impact of the verification process by distinguishing between emotions and moods. Moods are affective responses that are longer in duration than emotions, they have less intensity, and are more diffuse and global with no specific target. This study used data from four consecutive 1-week daily diary reports kept by respondents over the first 3 years of marriage (Tallman, Burke, and Gecas 1998). From the daily self-ratings, two mood scales were derived: unease/distress and activity/arousal. Identity-disrupting events were noted in the daily diaries including receiving bad news regarding health, having problems and hassles on the job, having difficulties with friends or neighbors, and other similar events. Using hierarchical linear model regressions, Burke found that identity-disrupting events increased the level of unease/distress on the day they were reported, but they also increased the level of unease/distress on the day after the event (though to a lesser degree), indicating the kind of persistence of mood to an extent much longer than the persistence of emotions (Stets and Osborn 2008).

Thus, while progress has been made over the last 15 years in understanding the role of emotions in identity processes, there is room for much more work. Three issues stand out in this regard. Little work has been done either theoretically or empirically with respect to the specific emotions that people have and the consequences of those specific emotions for both identities and the social structure as they play out in interaction. A second issue in need of understanding concerns the impact of emotion both on the internal-verification process (as in the Stets and Osborne [2008] research mentioned earlier) and on the external aspects of identity, including salience and commitment. Finally, linkages between short-term emotions, longer term moods, and still longer term outcomes of self-esteem are needed.

Work on the Measurement of Identities

Advances in the measurement of identities and identity processes is one area that has seen only modest development in the last 15 years.

Measuring identities and identity processes in ways that do not call for self-reports would be a great advantage. The typical measurement process is both intrusive and time-consuming and may influence the identity or process that is being measured.

Some development beyond the usual questionnaire procedures has occurred. Experiential sampling procedures such as Burke and Franzoi (1988) may be further developed. Measuring identity standards as probability distributions of meaning rather than points (see Cantwell, this volume) is another important advance, along with the use of Bayesian methods for estimating effects of identities viewed as probability distributions (Hoey and Schröder 2015). Implicit attitude theory (IAT) and measurement when applied to the self and identities is another methodological avenue that should be developed (Greenwald and Farnham 2000). The link between brain processes involved in the default mode network and identity processes as revealed by fMRI studies is beginning to be understood (Niemeyer 2013) and may be the source of new ways of measuring identity processes. Finally, we should mention the electroencephalographic (EEG) procedures being developed to measure the internal identity processing of verifying and nonverifying outcomes in interaction (see Kalkhoff, Serpe, Pollock, Miller, and Pfeiffer, this volume). Each of these nontraditional procedures for measuring identities and identity processes has the potential to move the field forward in unanticipated ways.

In one sense, it is remarkable that we have progressed to the level of understanding of identities that we have using available time-consuming and intrusive procedures, but we believe the future lies in new procedures being developed.

THE FUTURE

Overall, we have seen considerable advancement in identity theory on the issues that were raised 15 years ago. We have seen progress in merging the two strands (external and internal) of identity theory and in understanding the relationship among the multiple identities that one holds, though,

as we pointed out, there is still work to be done. We need better understanding of the different bases of identities, and we need to expand our knowledge of the role of emotions in understanding identity processes (indeed, there are several chapters in the current volume that do this). As mentioned, the fifth issue, measuring identities and identity processes without using self-reports has the most work remaining, though there is beginning to be some progress in this area. Thus, there remains much to be accomplished in the next 15 years on the five issues previously identified and on the following, newer issues we identify.

Stigmatized Identities

Most of the identities that have been studied from the point of view of identity theory are positive or normative in nature. Identities that, from a societal point of view, are negative or counternormative raise interesting questions. Do the holders of these identities view themselves in negative terms and attempt to verify such negative identities? Or, do they see themselves in a positive light, choosing identity meanings that differ from the dominant group's meanings and are more positive in tone? Asencio and Burke (2011) have looked at this issue among incarcerated offenders with respect to the criminal identity, and several of the chapters in this volume are also beginning to address these issues.

Relationship of Identity Theory to Other Theories in Social Psychology

One can envision a time when all of the current major theories in social psychology are each understood to be a part of the larger jigsaw puzzle of understanding human social behavior and interaction. These parts are not in competition, but fitting them together and understanding how they each interrelate is only beginning to be explored. For example, Stets and Burke (2000) explored the link between identity theory and social

identity theory, Burke (1997) and Savage et al. (2014) have looked at the way in which identity theory and network exchange theories are connected. Chapters in this volume also explore the link between identity theory and exchange theory as well as the relationship between identity theory and expectation states theory. But, there are many theoretical integrations that need to be investigated. A number of these can take the shape of exploring how identity theory may be incorporated into other substantive areas such as race/ethnicity, gender, religion, social movements, and social media to supplement existing theories and expand our knowledge. Chapters in the current volume have begun to explore the application of identity theory to these areas.

Advances in the Theory Itself

Identity theory, like any other theory, is not complete. Important concepts are likely to be discovered as missing from the current theory, as are identity processes yet to be discovered or elaborated, such as the rate of verification and whether verification is a process or an outcome. These elaborations and additions need to be explored. The implications of viewing identities not as points of meaning but as distributions of meaning—a rather fundamental change—is explored in this volume, as is the idea of incorporating an ideal self-guide and ought self-guide to the central core of concepts. A greater understanding of cognitive strategies in response to nonverification is needed, as well as a more complete understanding of the emotional outcomes of verification and nonverification. Other additions or modifications to the theory will no doubt be found in the future, and we can only encourage this work.

NOTES

1. This communication asserted the potential of finding in Burke's (1991) graphical representations of the cycle of the processes postulated in perceptual control model of identities "locations" at which self-evaluations (like self-esteem) occur.

2. Affect control theory (Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) takes a different approach by measuring only the evaluation, potency, and activity meanings of identities, thus facilitating comparisons among different identities.

3. While the term "social identity" can refer to identities based either on social categories or social groups of individuals, it is important to maintain the distinction (Stryker 2000).

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